How the Statute of Uses Became Operative in Colorado with a Telling Effect by Scallen, Thomas K.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 11 Article 6 
June 2021 
How the Statute of Uses Became Operative in Colorado with a 
Telling Effect 
Thomas K. Scallen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas K. Scallen, How the Statute of Uses Became Operative in Colorado with a Telling Effect, 26 Dicta 
310 (1949). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
How The Statute of Uses Became Operative in
Colorado With a "Telling" Effect
THOMAS K. SCALLEN*
Henry Moore Teller, a young member of the Illinois Bar arrived in
Colorado Territory in April of 1861, settling at Central City in Gilpin
county which was then affectionately referred to as the "Little Kingdom of
Gilpin." Mining was the leading industry and a gold-mine stock boom in the
winter of 1863 and spring of 1864 made Central City a center of commerce.
Willard Teller soon joined his older brother and the two erected the
Teller House at Central City, where the celebrated "Face on the Barroom
Floor" may still be seen. Henry Teller was elected to the Senate of the United
States in 1876 and was later Secretary of the Interior under President Arthur,
while Willard Teller developed the extensive practice of the Teller law firm.
In 1897, Willard Teller was retained by Samuel B. Morgan to prosecute
and argue an appeal from an action of ejectment brought in the Federal
circuit court for the district of Colorado by the City of Denver and Platt
Rogers, as mayor. The defendant, Morgan, traced his title to, and relied upon,
a patent from the United States granting t6 Joseph E. Bates, former mayor
of the City of Denver, and to his successors and assigns forever, lands de-
cribed, including the land in controversy, in trust for the City of Denver.
The circuit court had sustained a demurrer to the defendant Morgan's answer
setting up such chain of title.
Morgan v. Rogers et al.,' came on before the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit. Willard Teller, appearing for the plaintiff in error,
argued that the Statute of Uses (27 Hen. VIII, c. 10) was part of the common
law of Colorado, that the use was executed on the delivery of the patent, and
that thus both the legal and equitable title to the property passed at once to,
and vested in, the City of Denver, as the cestui que use. Teller's argument
was successful and the judgment was reversed. This was the first case on
appeal to invoke the Statute of Uses in Colorado. If any lawyer in Colorado
should have good reason to remember the Statute of Uses, Willard Teller was
that lawyer, and thereby hangs a tale.
Somewhat earlier, in 1887, Ellen R. Seymour and W. G. Pell, owners of
certain mining property conveyed the same to the Slide and Spur Gold Mines
Company (Limited). In 1889, the company having defaulted in the pay-
ment of the purchase price of the property, the vendors, Seymour and Pell,
sued in the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado to have
decreed a vendor's lien upon the property sold, and in July, 1890, obtained
a decree establishing their lien. In September, 1894, the master in chancery
sold the property under the decree. On May 11, 1895 he gave a deed which
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recited that the complainants were allowed in and by the terms of the decree
to bid for the property at the sale up to the amount of the decree without
paying cash except sufficient to pay costs, and that thereupon Willard Teller
bid for the said complainants, in his name for the use of the complainants,, and
that being the highest bidder, the property was sold to him. The deed then
recited:
"Now therefore I, Adolphus Capron, master in chancery afore-
said, do by these presents grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said Wil-
lard Teller, trustee, and to his heirs and assigns forever the said real
estate * * * to have and to hold to the said Willard Teller, trustee,
for his heirs and assigns forever."
Why title was taken by Willard Teller as trustee for Seymour and Pell
was soon apparent when three days after the deed was recorded, May 13,
1895, David Hill recovered a judgment against Seymour and Pell et al., and
a transcript thereof was filed in the office of the clerk of the county of Boulder
wherein the property was situate. In April, 1895, Hill sued to subject the
mining property held by Teller, trustee, to the judgment of Hill and to have
his judgment declared a prior lien to any claim of Teller. Hill received a
judgment awarding the relief prayed for and Teller appealed. Willard Teller
was represented in his appeal by his elder brother, Senator Henry M. Teller
(who had also been his partner when Morgan v. Rogers, supra, was decided)
and by the youngest brother, James H. Teller.
Hill's position was that the Statute of Uses executed the legal estate con-
veyed to Teller and united both the legal and equitable estate in Seymour and
Pell. The estate thus created, Hill contended, was subject by operation of law
to a lien in Hill and such lien was superior to any secret lien between Teller
and the benficiaries under the master's deed.
Teller denied that the Statute of Uses was in force in Colorado! He also
contended that if it was, the statute did not operate, as the trust was an
active one, and further that the firm of Teller & Orahood had an attorney's
lien upon the estate created by the master, superior to the lien created by
.Hill's transcript of judgment.
The Colorado Supreme Court held, Teller v. Hill,2 that the trust was a
passive one, upon which the Statute of Uses would operate and that a judg-
ment lien was superior to an attorney's lien in favor of the trustee of which
the judgment creditor had no notice. As to the crucial issue of whether the
Statute of Uses was in force in Colorado, the court simply said:
"That the Statute of Uses was one of the statutes so adopted by
this commonwealth, was ruled in Morgan v. Rogers (Cir. Ct. App.,
8 Cir.), 79 Fed. 577. No authority is cited to the contrary."
t Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 72 Pac. 811 (1903). The rule of law laid down
in this case is now subject to the qualification imposed by statute (C.S.A., 1935, c. 40,
sec. 9) requiring (1) a designation of the beneficiary and (2) that the trust either be
defined or that there be a reference to some instrument of record which recites the terms
of the trust.
